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I. INTRODUCTION
ONSUMER welfare is the common concern of the antitrust laws
and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection
Act (DTPA). I Antitrust laws, however, primarily address the
misuse of market power to harm consumers, while the DTPA focuses on
* B.B.A., St. Mary's University; J.D., Baylor University; Shareholder, Cox Smith
Matthews Incorporated, San Antonio, Texas.
** B.A., Brandeis University; J.D., Hastings College of the Law; Partner, Pulman,
Cappuccio, Pullen & Benson, LLP, San Antonio, Texas.
*** B.A., Texas A&M University; M.Ed., Texas State University, J.D., Southern Meth-
odist University Dedman School of Law; Associate, Cox Smith Matthews Incorporated,
San Antonio, Texas.
1. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-17.63 (West 2011).
SMU LAW REVIEW
consumer harm brought about through deception.2 The antitrust laws
and the DTPA therefore are best viewed as focusing on complementary
aspects of consumer welfare.
This Article covers significant developments under federal and Texas
antitrust laws and the DTPA during the Survey period, November 1, 2009
through October 31, 2010.
II. ANTITRUST
The one antitrust case from the U.S. Supreme Court this term ad-
dressed whether the National Football League (NFL) and its teams are
capable of illegal concerted action. Lower federal courts in Texas consid-
ered the Louisiana tobacco settlement and antitrust pleading standards.
The one reported antitrust decision from the Texas state courts involved
antitrust standing and antitrust injury.
A. CONCERTED ACTION
In American Needle, Inc. v. National Football League,3 the Supreme
Court considered whether, when licensing intellectual property, the
thirty-two teams of the NFL are separate economic actors capable of con-
spiring with each other or whether they constitute a single economic actor
incapable of concerted action among themselves. The teams formed Na-
tional Football League Properties (NFLP) in 1963 to develop, license,
and market their intellectual property. The teams are able to withdraw
from the arrangement, and at various times, some have sought to do so.
Most of the revenues generated by NFLP have been donated to charity
or shared equally among the teams. 4
In 2000, NFLP began to grant exclusive licenses, including one specifi-
cally to Reebok. American Needle previously had a nonexclusive licen-
see, but in 2000 NFLP declined to renew the license. American Needle,
sued alleging that the agreements between the NFL, its teams, NFLP, and
Reebok violated the Sherman Act. 5 The defendants responded that the
teams, NFL, and NFLP were incapable of conspiring within the meaning
of Sherman Act § 1 "because they are a single economic enterprise, at
least with respect to the conduct challenged."' 6
The district court granted summary judgment on this point, holding
that for purposes of exploiting their intellectual property, the NFL de-
fendants "have so integrated their operations that they should be deemed
a single entity rather than joint ventures cooperating for a common pur-
pose. ' '7 The Seventh Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted
2. Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. 330, 342 (1979); Roy B. Taylor Sales, Inc. v. Holly-
matic Corp., 28 F.3d 1379, 1382 (5th Cir. 1994); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44(a).
3. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206 (2010).
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certiorari.8
The Supreme Court explained that the inquiry was a functional one
that did not rely on whether the parties involved were legally distinct
entities.9 Members of a single entity are capable of violating § 1 when the
entity is "controlled by a group of competitors and serve[s], in essence, as
a vehicle for ongoing concerted activity." 10 On the other hand, "there is
not necessarily concerted action simply because more than one legally
distinct entity is involved."11 The relevant inquiry is whether the action
in question joins together separate economic interests, or "independent
centers of decisionmaking," and thus deprives the marketplace of actual
or potential competition. 12
The Court held that the NFL's thirty-two teams did "not possess either
the unitary decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic
power" so as to render them a single economic actor. 13 In addition to
being separately and independently owned and managed, the teams com-
pete for fans, managers, and players and compete in the market for intel-
lectual property. 14 The Court rejected the argument that the formation
of NFLP changed this analysis. 15 NFLP's existence as a single entity is
nondispositive and "[a]n ongoing § 1 violation cannot evade § 1 scrutiny
simply by giving the ongoing violation a name and label."' 16 The teams'
"interests in licensing [their] team trademarks are not necessarily al-
igned," and the teams, while presumably all interested in promoting the
NFL brand, "have distinct, potentially competing interests.'
7
The defendants argued that their actions were immune because NFLP
pursued the "common interests of the whole."'1 8 The Court rejected this
argument, holding that "illegal restraints often are in the common inter-
ests of the parties to the restraint, at the expense of those who are not
parties."19 The Court likewise rejected the defendants' reliance on the
fact that NFLP had operated since 1963 on the ground that "a history of
concerted activity does not immunize conduct from § 1 scrutiny."' 20 Nor
was the Court moved by the defendants' justification for their coopera-
tion, holding that "[t]he justification for cooperation is not relevant to
whether that cooperation is concerted or independent action."2'
The Court acknowledged that because NFLP is a separate corporation
with its own management, and because most revenues generated by
8. Id. at 2207-08.
9. Id. at 2209.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 2210.
12. Id. at 2211-12.
13. Id. at 2212.
14. Id. at 2212-13.
15. Id. at 2214.





21. Id. at 2214.
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NFLP are shared by the teams on an equal basis, the question of whether
NFLP decisions can constitute concerted activity was a close call.22 Ab-
sent an agreement to cooperate in exploiting their intellectual property,
however, nothing would prevent the teams from making their own mar-
ket decisions regarding intellectual property.23 The Court recognized:
"agreements made within a firm can constitute concerted action covered
by § 1 when the parties to the agreement act on interests separate from
those of the firm .... *24 Here, the teams, operating through NFLP,
remain "potential competitors with economic interests that are distinct
from NFLP's financial well-being. 25 The Court concluded that NFLP
was "an instrumentality" of the teams in making the licensing decisions.2 6
While the teams shared in NFLP's profits or losses, competitors cannot
simply create a joint venture to "get around" antitrust review.27
The Court did indicate that while the defendants' actions were not im-
mune from antitrust scrutiny, American Needle would face a nearly in-
surmountable hurdle on remand because the nature of the NFL would
"provide[ ] a perfectly sensible justification for making a host of collective
decisions."'28 Where cooperation and restraints on competition are re-
quired to ensure business survival, such agreements are likely to survive
the rule of reason and "depending upon the concerted activity in ques-
tion," the rule of reason may not require detailed analysis. 29 In the case
of the NFL, the Court concluded, the interest in maintaining a competi-
tive balance among athletic teams "may well justify a variety of collective
decisions made by the teams."'30
Justice Stevens wrote for a unanimous majority, and the opinion sug-
gests that the price of unanimity was a calculated vagueness in specifying
the standard by which an arrangement among competitors is deemed uni-
lateral or concerted action under § 1. Although the Court's opinion re-
cites a familiar list of characteristics that are insufficient to automatically
classify an arrangement as either unilateral or concerted action,31 the
Court's opinion describes its "functional analysis" as an inquiry into
"whether there is a 'contract, combination . . . or conspiracy' amongst
'separate economic actors pursuing separate economic interests,' such
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2214-15.
24. Id. at 2215.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2215-16.
28. Id. at 2216.
29. Id. at 2216-17.
30. Id. at 2217.
31. Id. at 2214 ("[F]or many such [joint] ventures, the participation of others is neces-
sary. But that does not mean that necessity of cooperation transforms concerted action
into independent action .... The mere fact that the teams operate jointly in some sense
does not mean that they are immune."); id. at 2215-16 ("competitors 'cannot simply get
around' antitrust liability by acting 'through a third-party intermediary or 'joint venture"'
(quoting Major League Baseball Prop., Inc. v. Salvino, Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 336 (2d Cir.
2008)) (Sotomayor, J., concurring in judgment)); see also supra notes 8-10, 13-14 and ac-
companying text.
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that the agreement 'deprives the marketplace of independent centers of
decisionmaking,' and therefore of 'diversity of entrepreneurial interests,'
and thus of actual or potential competition. '32
As a workable test, this is not much better than saying concerted action
is joint action because parties have separate economic interests. The
Court's reasons for finding plurality in NFLP's licensing arrangement do,
however, offer useful clues. The opinion notes that the teams' arrange-
ment lacked both a "unitary decisionmaking quality" and a "single aggre-
gation of economic power," suggesting that the Court found it important
that the teams were free to individually license outside of joint arrange-
ment and that NFLP's licensing decisions required the assent of more
than a "mere majority" of its members. 33
The Court's emphasis on these factors appropriately suggests that com-
petitor collaborations, short of an outright merger, will almost always be
subject to § 1 analysis. This interpretation is supported by the Court's
refusal to "pass upon" the government's suggestion that concerted action
should not be found if the parties "have effectively merged the relevant
aspect of their operations, thereby eliminating actual and potential com-
petition ... in that operational sphere" and the arrangement "[does] not
significantly affect actual or potential competition . . . outside their
merged operations. '34 "[B]ecause the teams still own their own trade-
marks and are free to market those trademarks as they see fit," NFLP did
not represent an effective merger of the teams' trademark interests. 35
The opinion's closing observations, which assured the teams that a plu-
rality finding does not mean they are "trapped by antitrust law," noted
that "'the special characteristics of this industry may provide a justifica-
tion' for many kinds of agreements. '36 The Court's elaboration on this
theme, however, may offer defendants less comfort than it first appears.
The Court observes that "[w]hen 'restraints on competition are essential
if the product is to be available at all,"' condemnation of these restraints
as per se illegal is not appropriate, and in such instances the arrangement
is likely to survive the rule of reason. 37 It is far from clear, however, that
NFLP's licensing activities are "necessary to market the product at all."'38
Indeed, the Court's opinion seems to recognize that "[o]ther features of
the NFL may also save agreements amongst the teams," such as "'the
interest in maintaining a competitive balance"' among them. 39 It is note-
worthy that the case cited by the Court for this proposition, NCAA v.
32. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212 (citations omitted).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2211 n.9.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2216 (quoting Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 252 (1996) (Stevens,
J., dissenting)).
37. Id. (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984)).
38. Id. (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 23
(1979)).
39. Id. at 2217 (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117).
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Board of Regents,40 is one where the Court held the need to maintain
competitive balance among football teams was insufficient to justify the
restraint involved.
B. TOBACCO SETTLEMENT LEGISLATION
In Xcaliber International Limited LLC v. Attorney General of Louisi-
ana4 1 and S&M Brands, Inc. v. Caldwell,4 2 two Fifth Circuit panels con-
sidered antitrust challenges to the Master Settlement Agreement (MSA)
that resolved litigation regarding tobacco-related health care costs. Sev-
eral states had previously sued the four largest tobacco manufacturers
(the Original Participating Manufacturers or OPMs). The states alleged
that the marketing and use of tobacco products cost the states billions of
dollars in increased health care costs. 43 The MSA was the result of a
settlement between the OPMs and a number of governmental entities
(the Settling States), one of which was Louisiana.44 The MSA released
the OPMs from past, present, and future tobacco-related claims in ex-
change for, among other things, annual payments into a MSA fund. The
settlement permitted non-OPM tobacco manufacturers to join the MSA
as Subsequent Participating Manufacturers (SPMs). 45 SPMs were also re-
quired to make payments into the MSA fund, although the amount and
timing of the payments varies depending on when they obtained SPM
status.
46
Because the MSA required OPMs and SPMs to pay for costs not in-
curred by tobacco manufacturers that sold tobacco products in the state
but did not participate in the MSA, the MSA encourages the Settling
States to pass the "Escrow Statute" addressing obligations of Non-Partici-
pating Manufacturers (NPMs). 47 Louisiana passed such a statute, under
which an NPM is required to either join the MSA or make an annual
deposit into a qualified escrow account based on the quantity of ciga-
rettes that NPM sold in the state during the prior calendar year.48 The
interest earned on the escrow account is paid out to the NPM, while the
principal is held for twenty-five years or paid to the State of Louisiana to
satisfy a judgment against the NPM, whichever comes first.49
The Escrow Statute also provides that the account returns to an NPM
monies deemed as overpaid compared to OPMs and SPMs. In 2003, this
provision was amended (the 2003 Amendment) to close a perceived loop-
hole that would allow certain NPMs to pay less than OPMs and SPMs. 50
40. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 88.
41. Xcaliber Int'l Ltd. v. Att'y Gen. of La., 612 F.3d 368, 371 (5th Cir. 2010).
42. S&M Brands, Inc. v. Caldwell, 614 F.3d 172, 173-74 (5th Cir. 2010).
43. Id. at 174; Xcaliber Int'l, 612 F.3d at 371.
44. S&M Brands, 612 F.3d at 174.
45. Id.
46. Xcaliber Int'l, 612 F.3d at 371-72; S&M Brands, 614 F.3d. at 174.
47. S&M Brands, 614 F.3d at 174.
48. Id.
49. Xcaliber Int'l, 612 F.3d at 372; S&M Brands, 614 F.3d. at 174-75.
50. Xcaliber Int'l, 612 F.3d at 373.
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The 2003 Amendment thus changed the amount released back to the
NPM, not the per cigarette amount paid in.51
Xcaliber, an NPM, filed suit against the Louisiana Attorney General
seeking a declaration that the 2003 Amendment violated, and was pre-
empted by, the Sherman Act. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the Attorney General, and Xcaliber appealed. 52
Applying the two-step analysis of Rice v. Norman Williams Co.,53 the
Fifth Circuit considered (1) whether the Escrow Statute "mandates or
authorizes conduct that necessarily constitutes a violation of the antitrust
laws in all cases, or ... places irresistible pressure on a private party to
violate the antitrust laws in order to comply with the statute;" and (2)
"whether the statute [was] saved from preemption by the state action im-
munity doctrine. ' 54 The court concluded that the 2003 Amendment did
not "force or allow private parties to collude, set prices, divide markets,
or in any other manner violate antitrust law," and that the statute there-
fore, did not "mandate or authorize conduct that necessarily constitutes a
violation of the antitrust laws in all cases. '55 Nor did the 2003 Amend-
ment "place[ ] irresistible pressure on a private party to violate the anti-
trust law in order to comply with the statute" as it did not pressure NPMs
to conspire in violation of antitrust laws. 56 The court rejected Xcaliber's
argument that the 2003 Amendment violated the Sherman Act under a
hybrid restraint analysis. 57 A hybrid violation occurs when a private
price-fixing conspiracy is concealed by a purported state-administered
price stabilization scheme. 58 The court concluded that because violations
based on hybrid restraints arise when the government gives regulatory
authority to private parties, which was not the case with the 2003 Amend-
ment, there was no violation.59
Although the court found that Xcaliber failed to establish the first
prong of the Rice test, it went on to consider whether the 2003 Amend-
ment could be saved from preemption by the state action doctrine.60
Xcaliber alleged that the 2003 Amendment, together with the MSA and
statutes implementing it, facilitated a cartel intentionally protecting the
market shares of the OPMs and SPMs and driving NPMs out of busi-
ness.61 Xcaliber further alleged that Louisiana acted at the behest of the
OPMs in enacting the legislation and therefore had "attempted to author-
ize a private conspiracy that would clearly violate the antitrust laws but
51. Id. at 372-73.
52. Id. at 373.
53. See Rice v. Norman Williams Co., 458 U.S. 654, 661 (1982).
54. Xcaliber Int'l, 612 F.3d at 374 (quoting Rice, 458 U.S. at 661).
55. Id. at 375.
56. Id. (quoting Rice, 458 U.S. at 661).
57. Id. at 376.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 376-77.




for the State's involvement. '62
The court concluded that Xcaliber's evidence of the OPMs' involve-
ment in the legislation's enactment "amount[ed] to little more than spec-
ulation," particularly when contrasted with Louisiana's stated reasons for
entering into the MSA and the 2003 Amendment, as well as the actual
effect of the statute, which already reduced cigarette consumption and
reimbursement to the states for public costs of cigarette consumption.63
The fact that the OPMs and SPMs may have lobbied in favor of the legis-
lation did not establish "that the Louisiana legislature acted solely at their
behest. '64 Recognizing that lobbying efforts are protected from antitrust
liability, the court concluded that it would be highly incongruous for a
"legislature to run afoul of antitrust law when it passes a statute after
lobbying by private parties."'65
The plaintiffs in S&M Brands alleged that "the MSA creates a national
cigarette cartel designed to increase the prices paid out to the OPMs and
protect the OPMs market share. ' 66 They further asserted that the only
defense even potentially available to the attorney general was Parker v.
Brown immunity, but that such immunity did not apply because Louisi-
ana was acting as a private player when it agreed to restrain trade.67 The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant.68
The Fifth Circuit held that Xcaliber foreclosed the plaintiffs' argument
that the Escrow Statute was a per se violation of the Sherman Act.69 The
court then joined the Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits in rejecting the
argument that the MSA and Escrow Statute working together created an
antitrust violation. 70 The plaintiffs unsuccessfully tried to argue that the
statutory scheme provided a disincentive for the NPMs to engage in price
competition with the OPMs and SPMs. Quoting at length from the Sixth
Circuit's opinion in Tritent International Corp. v. Kentucky, the court held
that the plaintiffs' complaint was really with the behavior of the OPMs
and SPMs following the MSA's enactment, which was neither mandated
nor explicitly authorized by Louisiana's legislation.71 Accordingly, the
court found no merit to the plaintiffs' arguments that the MSA and Es-
crow Statute violated federal antitrust laws. 72
C. PLEADING FEDERAL ANTITRUST CLAIMS
In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court in Leegin Creative Leather Products,
62. Id. at 378.
63. Id. at 379.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 380.
66. S&M Brands, Inc. v. Caldwell, 614 F.3d 172, 176 (5th Cir. 2010).
67. ld. (implied state action immunity).
68. Id. at 173.
69. Id. at 176.
70. Id. at 177.
71. Id. (citing Tritent Int'l Corp. v. Ky., 467 F.3d 547, 557 (6th Cir. 2006)).
72. Id.
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Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.73 overturned ninety-six years of precedent to hold that
minimum resale price maintenance should be judged under the Rule of
Reason. The case was remanded to the district court, which granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss. During the Survey period, the Fifth Cir-
cuit affirmed the dismissal, and the Supreme Court thereafter denied
certiorari. 74
Leegin manufactures the Brighton line of women's accessories, which
are sold both in company stores and in independently-owned boutiques
that purchase the goods from Leegin at wholesale. Leegin sold Brighton
products to the plaintiff, a women's clothing and accessories specialty
store.75 In 1997, the plaintiff violated a resale price maintenance (RPM)
policy instituted by Leegin.76 When the plaintiff refused to stop discount-
ing, Leegin suspended all shipments of Brighton products to the plain-
tiff.77 The plaintiff sued, alleging that Leegin violated § 1 of the Sherman
Act by entering into illegal agreements with retailers to fix the prices of
Brighton products and by terminating the plaintiff as a result of those
agreements. 78
After the Supreme Court's decision, the plaintiff filed an amended
complaint alleging: (1) Leegin's RPM policy was an unreasonable re-
straint of trade under both per se and Rule of Reason analysis; (2)
Leegin's most successful retailers had "reached a consensus regarding
special occasion discounts and enticements," and the agreement was
adopted by Leegin; (3) Leegin was the hub in a hub-and-spoke conspir-
acy; and (4) Leegin was involved in a horizontal price-fixing conspiracy at
the retail level because it agreed on prices with other retailers. 79 The
plaintiff also alleged that RPM should be analyzed differently than other
vertical restraints in the dual distribution context. 80 The district court
granted Leegin's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff "failed to
plead a plausible relevant market" and that the plaintiff's newly-pled hor-
izontal claims were barred by the mandate rule and failed as a matter of
law.81
The plaintiff alleged "(1) the 'retail market for Brighton's women's ac-
cessories' and (2) the 'wholesale sale of brand-name women's accessories
to independent retailers"' as the relevant product markets. 82 It claimed
that "Leegin had market power [in these markets] based on its 'highly
73. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-82 (2007).
The Supreme Court's decision was reported in the 2008 Survey. See 61 SMU L. REV. 531,
533-37 (2008).
74. Leegin Creative Leather Prods, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 414 (5th Cir.
2010), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3329 (U.S. Feb. 22, 2011) (No. 10-653).
75. Id.
76. Id. at 414-15.
77. Id. at 415.
78. Id. at 414-15.






differentiated products,' its large showroom at the Dallas trade show, and
its alleged position as the largest among an unspecified number of manu-
facturers in the proposed wholesale market. '83
Finding these allegations inadequate, the Fifth Circuit held that an anti-
trust plaintiff must plead a "proposed relevant market with reference to
the rule of reasonable interchangeability and cross-elasticity of de-
mand. ' 84 A "proposed relevant market [allegation] that clearly does not
encompass all interchangeable substitute products even when all factual
inferences are granted in plaintiff's favor" is legally insufficient. 85 The
court concluded that neither of the plaintiff's proposed relevant markets
met this test.86
While in certain "rare circumstances, a single brand ... can constitute a
relevant market for antitrust purposes," the court held that a single-brand
market was appropriate only where "consumers are 'locked in' to a spe-
cific brand by the nature of the product. ' 87 According to the court, the
plaintiff failed to allege any "structural barrier to the interchangeability
of Brighton products with goods produced by competing manufacturers"
and failed to properly allege that Brighton products were a submarket.88
The plaintiff's second proposed relevant market definition failed be-
cause: (1) "wholesale sale" improperly focused on the distribution level,
not the product; (2) the plaintiff failed to "sufficiently" allege why Brigh-
ton goods were not interchangeable with non-brand name products; (3)
there was no relevance to the use of "independent retailers" in the mar-
ket definition because the plaintiff failed to allege facts that established
why independent retailers do not compete with larger chain stores in dis-
tribution of Brighton products; and (4) "women's accessories" was not
sufficiently specific to constitute a market over which Leegin had power 89
because pleading a vertical restraint claim requires a plausible allegation
of a defendant's market power.90
The Fifth Circuit also found flaws in the plaintiff's allegations of an-
ticompetitive harm, holding that the allegation that the "RPM program
forced consumers to pay 'artificially' high prices for Brighton products...
defie[d] the basic laws of economics." 91 The court determined, appar-
ently from its own experience, that a price increase by Leegin would
83. Id.
84. Id. at 417 (quoting Apani Sw., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 300 F.3d 620, 628
(5th Cir. 2002)).
85. Id. at 417-18.
86. Id. at 418.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. The plaintiff alleged, among other things, that Leegin "is viewed as the pre-
ferred supplier to stores offering women's accessories because of the selection and nature
of the product offerings, and the fact that it has decided to offer its products through a
large network of independent retailers." Second Amended Complaint at T 18, PSKS, Inc.
v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 2:03-CV-107-
TJW), 2008 WL 7715339 [hereinafter "PSKS Amended Complaint"].
90. Leegin, 615 F.3d at 419.
91. Id.
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merely cause loss of sales to its competitors. 92 Similarly, while the plain-
tiff alleged that the "RPM policy deprived consumers of 'free and open
competition in the purchase of Brighton-brand products,"' the court de-
termined that interbrand competition would press "Brighton retailers to
offer a combination of price and service that attracts consumers away
from competing products. ' 93 The court finally noted that the plaintiff
"never asserted that a cartel of retailers or one dominant retailer [was]
the 'source' of Leegin's RPM program. '94 The court concluded that even
if it accepted the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, there was no plausi-
ble allegation of harm to interbrand competition.95
Because the Fifth Circuit found that the plaintiff's market definition
and allegations of competitive harm were fatally flawed, it declined to
address three arguments made by amicus American Antitrust Institute:
(1) that the rule of reason amounts to a rule of per se legality for RPM
arrangements; 96 (2) that RPM arrangements should be treated as "inher-
ently suspect" because they lead to higher prices or reduced output, and
(3) that dual distribution systems should be presumptively illegal.97
Regarding the plaintiff's horizontal restraint claim, the court reiterated
its holding that the plaintiff failed to allege that retailers were the source
of price restraint explaining that a manufacturer's discussion of a pricing
policy with its retailers, and its subsequent decision to adjust that pricing
policy, does not give rise to an antitrust claim.98 The court rejected the
plaintiff's allegation of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy on similar grounds
that the plaintiff had not alleged that a dominant retailer imposed the
RPM policy or that retailers agreed on the policy amongst themselves.99
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that a restraint by a
dual distributor on its retailers should be analyzed as a horizontal re-
straint.100 Because Leegin must share its retail profits with other retail-
ers, "economic logic" indicated that Leegin would increase its own profits
by raising prices at the wholesale level and would "normally seek to mini-
mize retailer margins as much as possible, including at its own retail
stores."10 1
Four years ago, in the course of overruling 0 2 its ninety-six year old
precedent in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons,10 3 a five-to-
four Supreme Court majority offered assurance that rule of reason scru-
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. The plaintiff had, in fact, alleged that Leegin made changes to its pricing poli-
cies and started enforcing those policies "at the insistence of many of its most faithful retail
dealers." PSKS Amended Complaint, supra note 89, at 13.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 417.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 420.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 420-21.
101. Id.
102. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 881-82 (2007).
103. Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Parks & Sons, 220 U.S. 373, 384-85 (1911).
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tiny regarding resale price maintenance arrangements would be adequate
to detect and correct anticompetitive restraints:
As courts gain experience considering the effects of these re-
straints by applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions,
they can establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule operates
to eliminate anticompetitive restraints from the market and to pro-
vide more guidance to businesses. Courts can, for example, devise
rules over time for offering proof, or even presumptions where justi-
fied, to make the rule of reason a fair and efficient way to prohibit
anticompetitive restraints and to promote procompetitive ones. 10 4
If the Fifth Circuit's Leegin opinion on remand is any indication, this
process of "courts gain[ing] experience considering the effects of these
restraints by applying the rule of reason over the course of decisions, 10 5
may have both commenced and ended with Leegin itself. Affirming the
district court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint on re-
mand, 10 6 the Fifth Circuit's Leegin opinion invoked the Supreme Court's
decisions in Ashcroft v. Iqbal'0 7 and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly'08 to
justify its conclusion that the plaintiff's allegations were implausible and
"defie[d] the basic laws of economics,"' 0 9 and therefore unworthy of fur-
ther judicial attention.
The Fifth Circuit reached this result by concluding that neither of the
plaintiff's proposed relevant markets "encompasses interchangeable sub-
stitute products or recognizes the cross-elasticity of demand."' 10 Re-
markably, even though the Supreme Court charged the Fifth Circuit with
commencing the process of "applying the rule of reason over the course
of decisions ... [to] establish the litigation structure to ensure the rule
operates to eliminate anticompetitive restraints,"' ' the court failed to ac-
knowledge, much less address, specific allegations in the plaintiff's com-
plaint regarding substitute products and cross-elasticity. These
allegations include:
16. Leegin products are differentiated from other products by virtue
of carrying the "Brighton" brand. On its website, Leegin acknowl-
edges and boasts of how it is different from other products:
Today Brighton is the only major accessories line featuring prod-
ucts that coordinate from head to toe. A customer might choose a
lipstick case that matches a wallet, jewelry that matches a pair of
sunglasses, a handbag that matches her footwear, or an entire coordi-
nating collection consisting of multiple accessories.
The Company prides itself on the "Brighton Difference," which is
rooted in the philosophy that the difference is in the details.
104. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 898-99.
105. Id. at 898.
106. Leegin, 615 F.3d at 414.
107. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
108. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
109. Leegin, 615 F.3d at 419.
110. Id. at 418.
111. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 898 (2007).
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17. Because Leegin offers products that are highly differentiated, it
has market power.
25. Brighton-brand products are unique. Many customers do not
consider other accessories suitable substitutes for their use of Brigh-
ton-brand products, nor would they substitute other accessories for
Brighton-brand products, nor would they do so even in response to a
significant, non-transitory increase in the price of Brighton-brand
products.
26. Brighton-brand products are distinct products characterized by
an inelasticity in demand, and little cross-elasticity of demand be-
tween Brighton-brand products and demand for competing
products.112
Plainly, these are not mere "labels and conclusions"'1 13 to which no def-
erence is due under Twombly. Nor are they equally compatible with a
broader market, and hence "implausible" within the meaning of
Twombly 114 or Iqbal.115 Plausibility, however, implies a frame of refer-
ence and here, the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of the plaintiff's market defini-
tion as "implausible"11 6 is undoubtly explained less by reference to the
court's experience with women's accessories than as an inexorable prod-
uct of a particular economic philosophy the court chose to invoke. Under
the Chicago School brand of economics (repeatedly invoked in the
court's opinion), antitrust claims based on vertical restraints of trade are
inherently implausible. 117
Indeed, although the Fifth Circuit elected to elide the issue (raised by
amici), the effect of reassigning vertical restraints to rule of reason analy-
sis is to deem them per se legal. Lest anyone be tempted to dismiss this
argument as a hyperbole, attention is invited to Judge Posner's prescient
(if perhaps premature) 1981 Chicago Law Review article, The Next Step
in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality.118
Ironically, the Leegin panel declined to join issue with the amici's sug-
gestion that absent a presumption of illegality, the rule of reason amounts
to a rule of per se legality, yet, that is precisely what the remainder of the
Fifth Circuit's opinion managed to demonstrate. 11 9 As the plaintiff ar-
112. PSKS Amended Complaint supra note 89, at 11 16-17, 25-26 (emphasis added).
113. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
114. Id. at 556-57.
115. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).
116. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 417-19 (5th Cir.
2010).
117. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX, 280, 291, 299, 365 (1978).
118. Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distribu-
tion: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1981).
119. See Leegin, 615 F.3d at 417. Actually, the amci argued that the court should draw
instruction from the FFC's litigation structure by treating a RPM arrangement generally as
"inherently suspect" when it raises prices and at least "one of the factors identified by the
[Supreme] Court as likely to create significant anticompetitive risks is present." Brief for
the American Antitrust Institute as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellant and Reversal at
*5-15, PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Products, Inc., 615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 09-
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gued unsuccessfully in its petition for certiorari, the Fifth Circuit's opin-
ion raises a general legal conflict about whether courts can reject
economic proof as a basis for defining markets and market power.l20 In
particular:
* The Fifth Circuit's opinion conflicts with rulings by the Supreme
Court 121 and several circuits, 122 whose tests for finding single-
brand markets do not make a lock-in necessary but do make the
SSNIP test 23 or low cross-elasticity sufficient.
" The Fifth Circuit's holding that wholesale provision of products
cannot be a relevant market conflicts with the law of several other
circuits. 1
24
* The Fifth Circuit's holding that market power cannot be proven
directly but requires proving market definition and a large market
share, conflicts with several other circuits. 125
* The Fifth Circuit's imposition of a market power screen in the face
of direct evidence of anticompetitive effects likewise conflicts with
decisions of the Supreme Court 126 and several other Circuits. 27
As the petition for certiorari aptly observed, the Fifth Circuit's Leegin
opinion "raises an even more fundamental question: will modern anti-
trust jurisprudence live up to its aspiration of replacing arid formalisms
40506), 2009 WL 6479731 [hereinafter "Amicus Brief"]. Once the conduct was deemed
inherently suspect, the burden would shift to the defendant to come forward with a plausi-
ble legally plausible justification for the restraint. Id. at *5.
120. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Products,
Inc., 615 F.3d 412 (5th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-653), 2010 WL 4688107 [hereinafter "Petition for
Certiorari"].
121. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., 504 U.S. 451,482 (1992) ("This
Court's prior cases support the proposition that in some instances one brand of a product
can constitute a separate market.") (citing cases not involving lock-ins); Jefferson Parish
Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 (1984) ("[W]hether one or two products are
involved turns not on the functional relation between them, but rather on the character of
the demand for the two items.").
122. See, e.g., Queen City Pizza, Inc. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc., 129 F.3d 430, 439 (3d Cir.
1997); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 107 (3d Cir. 1980); Ky.
Speedway, LLC v. NASCAR, Inc., 588 F.3d 908, 917-18 (6th Cir. 2009); In re Brand Name
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 186 F.3d 781, 786-87 (7th Cir. 1999).
123. "SSNIP" is an acronym for a "small but significant nontransitory increase in
price," and is used to identify competing products for purposes of market definition. U.S.
Dep't of Justice & Fed. Trade Comm'n, MERGER GUIDELINES 9 (2010) [hereinafter Merger
Guidelines] available at http://ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf.
124. See, e.g., Schuykill Energy Res., Inc. v. Pa. Power & Light Co., 113 F.3d 405, 416
n.14 (3d Cir. 1997); City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 734 F.2d 1157, 1166
(6th Cir. 1984); Paschall v. Kan. City Star Co., 727 F.2d 692, 696 (8th Cir. 1984); JBL
Enters., Inc. v. Jhirmack Enters., Inc., 698 F.2d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1983); Ad-Vantage Tel.
Directory Consultants, Inc. v. GTE Directories Corp., 849 F.2d 1336, 1345 (11th Cir. 1987).
125. See, e.g., Re/Max Int'l, Inc. v. Realty One, Inc., 173 F.3d 995, 1018 (6th Cir. 1999)
(citing cases from the First, Eighth, Ninth and Tenth Circuits); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275
F.3d 191, 206-07 (2d Cir. 2001); Allen-Myland, Inc. v. IBM, 33 F.3d 194, 209 (3d Cir. 1994)
(citing cases from the Seventh Circuit); Brand Name, 186 F.3d at 786. It also conflicts with
the Merger Guidelines. See Merger Guidelines, supra note 123, at 7.
126. FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460 (1986).
127. K.M.B. Warehouse Distribs., Inc. v. Walker Mfg. Co., 61 F.3d 123, 128-29 (2d Cir.
1995); Ryko Mfg. Co. v. Eden Servs., 823 F.2d 1215, 1231 n.14 (8th Cir. 1987); Oltz v. St.
Peter's Cmty. Hosp., 861 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir. 1988).
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with sound economics, or will it have the more dismal legacy of replacing
old pro-plaintiff formalisms with new pro-defendant formalisms equally
lacking in economic merit?" 128 Inasmuch as the Supreme Court's denial
of certiorari "imports no expression of opinion upon the merits of the
case,"129 this question remains (outside the Fifth Circuit at least) unan-
swered, just as the important inter-circuit conflicts highlighted in the peti-
tion for certiorari 130 remain unresolved.
In Wampler v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.13 1 the Fifth Circuit
considered whether a complaint identifying a single multiple dwelling
unit (MDU) as a relevant geographic market could survive a motion to
dismiss. The plaintiffs were residents of an MDU. The MDU's owner
entered into "SmartMoves" contracts with AT&T, under which AT&T
held the exclusive right to provide video, voice, and broadband Internet
services to MDU residents. 132 The plaintiffs sued on behalf of themselves
and a class of residents of MDUs with similar arrangements, alleging that
the MDU/AT&T contracts violated the Sherman Act.133 The trial court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to plead a plausible
geographic market. 134
A relevant geographic market is one "in which the seller operates and
to which buyers can practicably turn for supplies."'1 35 This market must
"'correspond to the commercial realities of the industry,"' including size,
characteristics of the product in question, and regulatory constraints. 136
The market must also be "economically significant," which entails consid-
eration of the degree to which the market is affected by or independent
from competition outside the market.137
Applying these principles to the proposed market of a single MDU, the
Fifth Circuit held that the competitive forces bearing on a SmartMoves
contract for a single MDU keep such a market from being sufficiently
isolated to be economically significant. 38 First, because MDUs compete
with each other for tenants, an MDU owner has an incentive to provide
low cost/high quality services to attract tenants. 139 Second, service prov-
iders such as AT&T compete with each other for service contracts with
MDUs and thus have incentives to provide lower-cost and higher-quality
services. 140 Finally, a prospective tenant who does not like the services
128. Petition for Certiorari, supra note 120, at *35.
129. Missouri v. Jackson, 515 U.S. 70, 85 (1995) (quoting United States v. Carver, 260
U.S. 482, 490 (1923)).
130. See Petition for Certiorari, supra note 120, at *28-31.
131. Wampler v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 597 F.3d 741, 743 (5th Cir. 2010).
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 744.
135. Id. (quoting Apani Sw., Inc. v. Coca-Cola Enters., Inc., 300 F.3d 620, 626 (5th Cir.
2002)).
136. Id. (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962)).
137. Id. at 744-45.





provided by a particular MDU may simply choose to live elsewhere. 141
The court concluded that given the competition between MDU owners,
the competition between service providers, and "the highly mobile nature
of today's society, . . . a single MDU is [not] so segregated as to be eco-
nomically significant and thus cannot represent a plausible geographic
market." 142 The Fifth Circuit therefore affirmed the lower court's dismis-
sal of the plaintiffs' complaint.' 43
D. ANTITRUST STANDING AND ANTITRUST INJURY
Marlin v. Robertson'" was filed by two board-certified pediatric
neurosurgeons who practiced at Methodist Children's Hospital of South
Texas (Methodist Children's) in San Antonio. One plaintiff was the hos-
pital's CEO from 1998 through March 2003. In the summer of 2003, the
plaintiffs began to move their practice to North Central Baptist Hospital.
In December 2003, one plaintiff resigned her privileges at Methodist
Children's and the other took a leave of absence. In August 2004, the
plaintiff who took a leave of absence applied to Methodist Children's to
reinstate his privileges, but later withdrew his application. The plaintiffs
also had privileges at Christus Santa Rosa Health Care ("Christus") until
they resigned in 2000 and 2001. Both reapplied to Christus for their privi-
leges in July 2004, but later withdrew their applications. In November
2004, the plaintiffs closed their practice at North Central Baptist and later
closed their practice in San Antonio and moved to Florida in March
2005.145
The plaintiffs sued Methodist Children's, Christus, and various doctors
and doctor groups for violations of the Texas Free Enterprise and Anti-
trust Act, claiming that the hospitals' peer review or administrative re-
view process ultimately resulted in the plaintiffs' applications for
reinstatement at Methodist Children's and for privileges at Christus being
denied.146 The plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy in restraint of free trade
and monopolization of, or attempts to monopolize, the practice of pediat-
ric neurosurgery in Bexar County, Texas. 147
The trial court granted the defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment. 148 On appeal, the Fourth Court of Appeals first considered the
defendants' argument that the plaintiffs lacked antitrust standing.' 49 An-
titrust standing requires a demonstration of (1) injury-in-fact; (2) antitrust
injury; and (3) proper plaintiff status, which assures that other parties are
141. Id.
142. Id. at 746.
143. Id.
144. 307 S.W.3d 418, 423 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 426.
148. Id. at 424.
149. Id.
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not better situated to bring suit.150 In considering the antitrust injury ele-
ment, the court examined whether the plaintiffs' alleged injury was the
type of loss that the claimed violations would likely cause. 151 The court
rejected the defendants' argument that the plaintiffs were required to
show-at the standing stage-that the defendants" "conduct affected the
prices, quality, or quantity of a specific product within a relevant mar-
ket."152 The court concluded that such a requirement would confuse the
distinction between antitrust injury for purposes of standing and the ef-
fect on competition necessary to prevail on the merits.153 The court
quoted the Fifth Circuit's decision in Doctor's Hospital of Jefferson, Inc.
v. Southeast Medical Alliance, Inc.,a54 which held that "'the antitrust laws
do not require a plaintiff to establish a market-wide injury to competi-
tion,' which often is a component of substantive liability, 'as an element
of standing.""' 55 Therefore, the court concluded that the defendants'
analysis had "too narrowly focused on injury as a component of substan-
tive liability, rather than as an element of standing," and thus the defend-
ants "did not establish their entitlement to summary judgment... on the
issue of standing.' 56
Turning to the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the defendants argued
there was no antitrust injury to the Bexar County pediatric market be-
cause the plaintiffs chose to leave Methodist Children's, and later the city,
and their privileges were never terminated, revoked, suspended, or de-
nied.157 The defendants also argued that the plaintiffs could not show
any restraint on competition that affected the prices, quantity, or quality
of pediatric neurosurgery services in Bexar County.' 58
The plaintiffs also alleged a group boycott.' 59 The Fourth Court of Ap-
peals first determined that a per se analysis of this claim was inappropri-
ate because courts typically hold that a group of physicians who decide
not to make referrals to a particular surgeon have not committed a per se
violation.' 60 The court then considered whether the plaintiffs' claims
could survive a rule of reason analysis by proof that the defendants' con-
duct had an economic effect on the relevant market.' 6'
The plaintiffs' evidence included affidavits and deposition testimony
showing: (1) the former CEO of Methodist Children's resigned under
pressure from the defendant-doctors; (2) the CEO's request for a review
150. Id.
151. Id. at 425.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 426.
154. 123 F.3d 301, 305 (5th Cir. 1997).
155. Marlin v. Robertson, 307 S.W.3d 418, 425 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2009, no pet.)
(quoting Doctor's Hosp., 123 F.3d at 305).
156. Id. at 426.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 427.
159. Id. at 427-28.
160. Id. at 428 (citing Pontius v. Children's Hosp. 552 F. Supp. 1352, 1370 (W.D. Pa.
1982)).
161. Id. at 429.
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of his charts for the purpose of clearing his name and reputation was
denied; (3) the CEO's "forced" resignation left the other plaintiff with no
choice but to take a leave of absence because he was unable to provide
the required backup for emergency and on-call coverage; and (4) when he
was able to find backup and tried to end his leave of absence, he was
informed that he would have to reapply for credentialing. 162 The former
CEO then withdrew his request to reinstate his privileges because he was
"threatened with being reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank
due to a denial of credentials.' 1 63 The plaintiffs also withdrew their ap-
plications for privileges at Christus because the applications were in jeop-
ardy of being denied, which raised "the threat and probability of being
reported to the National Practitioner Data Bank."'1 64 According to the
plaintiffs, "it made economic sense for the defendants to replace the
plaintiffs with other doctors the defendants could more easily control."'1 65
The plaintiffs alleged that the relevant product market was for pediatric
neurosurgery services, and that the defendants' actions decreased the
quality of services available to consumers because the only two remaining
neurosurgeons practicing pediatric neurosurgery were not board certified
in that specialty. 166
The court found no evidence of harm to competition. 67 There was no
proof that the cost of pediatric neurosurgery had risen, and the plaintiffs
did not contend that prices for pediatric neurosurgery services would in-
crease over the competitive level.168 The plaintiffs also conceded that the
Board of Neurological Surgeons considered general neurosurgeons quali-
fied to perform pediatric neurosurgery, and the plaintiffs offered no evi-
dence that pediatric patients were unable to obtain necessary services in
Bexar County or that consumers' welfare was damaged. 169 The court
concluded that the plaintiffs had "failed to carry their burden of submit-
ting summary judgment proof sufficient to raise a fact issue on whether
the defendants' alleged actions had an adverse effect on competition in
the relevant market.' 170
Regarding the monopolization and attempted monopolization claims,
the plaintiffs proffered evidence that the defendant doctors worked to
eliminate the plaintiffs from their practice and then increased their own
business in the relevant market. 171 The court concluded that evidence
that the defendant hospitals elected to hire or grant privileges to other
neurosurgeons did not create a genuine issue of material fact about
whether any of the defendants possessed monopoly power in the relevant
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 430.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 431.
168. Id. at 430-31.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 431.
171. Id. at 432.
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market. 172 The court further concluded that the fact that the three re-
maining pediatric neurosurgeons worked at the two defendant hospitals
did not create a genuine issue of material fact whether a dangerous
probability existed that any of the defendants would achieve monopoly
power.173 Finally, the plaintiffs offered no evidence that the defendants
prevented other pediatric neurosurgeons from entering the relevant mar-
ket. 174 The court thus affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. 175
Despite doing so, the court properly rejected the defendants' effort to
conflate and confuse the distinction between antitrust injury and harm to
competition.1 76 As the Fifth Circuit explained several years ago in Doc-
tor's Hospital, "the antitrust laws do not require a plaintiff to establish a
market-wide injury to competition as an element of standing," and an
alleged exclusion from the market "fall[s] easily within the conceptual
bounds of antitrust injury."'1 77 Likewise, the court properly interpreted
the defendants' confused reference to no evidence of "antitrust injury to
the Bexar County pediatric market" as a challenge to the unreasonable
restraint element of a § 1 claim.178 Correctly noting evidence of harm to
a plaintiff is, without more, insufficient to demonstrate an unreasonable
restraint on competition, the court invoked the Texas Supreme Court's
decision in Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar for the proposition that to establish
an unreasonable restraint, the plaintiff must offer "evidence of demon-
strable economic effect."'1 79 As we explained in a prior survey, although
a statement to this effect appears in Harmar, it is wrong as a matter of
substantive antitrust law because an unreasonable restraint may be
demonstrated in a variety of other equally valid ways. 180 Absent proof
that the defendants possessed market power or that their conduct had
more impact on competition than any routine hospital credentialing deci-
sion, however, the court correctly held that the plaintiffs failed to sub-
stantiate either their § 1 or § 2 claims.181
III. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES-CONSUMER
PROTECTION ACT
Noteworthy DTPA decisions during the Survey period addressed con-




175. Id. at 437.
176. Id. at 426.
177. Doctor's Hosp. of Jefferson, Inc. v. Se. Med. Alliance, Inc., 123 F.3d 301, 305 (5th
Cir. 1997).
178. Marlin, 307 S.W.3d at 426-27.
179. Id. at 429 (quoting Coca-Cola Co. v. Harmar Bottling Co., 218 S.W.3d 671, 689
(Tex. 2006)).
180. A. Michael Ferrill, Leslie Sara Hyman, & William "Butch" Hulse, Antitrust and
Consumer Protection, 60 SMU L. REV. 669, 709 (2007).
181. Marlin, 307 S.W.3d at 431-32.
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tions, warranty violations, causation, survival of DTPA claims, and
damages.
A. STANDING AND CONSUMER STATUS
To bring a DTPA claim, a plaintiff must be a "consumer."'182 During
the Survey period, several federal courts in Texas examined whether bor-
rowers had standing to assert DTPA claims against entities servicing or
owning their mortgage loans, or whether such claims failed for lack of
consumer status.
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas reaffirmed
that a party who seeks only money in a transaction is not a DTPA con-
sumer.1 83 For example, in Hicks the court granted summary judgment to
Chase on Hicks' DTPA claims. 184 The court held that Chase, as the mere
servicer of Hicks' mortgage note and from whom Hicks sought an exten-
sion of credit, did not provide Hicks with a DTPA good or service.185 A
person who seeks only to borrow money is not a consumer under the
DTPA because merely lending money involves neither a good nor a
service. 186
In Huff v. Hirsch, a divorce action, the Houston Court of Appeals up-
held summary judgment in favor of Hirsch, an attorney sued by his cli-
ent's ex-wife.' 87 Mrs. Huff took issue with a divorce settlement obtained
in large part by Hirsch's efforts. The court held that Mrs. Huff did not
have consumer status, and therefore could not maintain her DTPA claims
against Hirsch. 188 Although the court held that a third-party beneficiary
may qualify as a consumer where the transaction at issue was specifically
intended to benefit the third party, and the good or service rendered
benefitted the third party, this is not what occurred here. 89 Hirsch's le-
gal services were not acquired by Mrs. Huff, but instead by Mr. Huff.19
Moreover, those services were adverse to Mrs. Huff, rather than for her
benefit. 191
182. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50 (West 2011) (a consumer is a one who
seeks to acquire goods or services by purchase or lease).
183. See Hicks v. Chase Home Fin. LLC, No. 3:09-CV-1652-G, 2010 WL 4274745, at *5
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 21, 2010).
184. Id. at *1.
185. Id. at *5.
186. Id.; see also Henderson v. WA-MU/Wash. Mut. Home Loans, No. 4:10-CV-164,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86343, at *8 (E.D. Tex. July 26, 2010), adopted by Henderson v.
WA-MU/Wash. Mut. Homes Loans, No. 4:10-CV-164, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86318, at *2
(E.D. Tex. Aug. 20, 2010); Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:10-CV-0381-B, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74329, at *10 (N.D. Tex. July 21, 2010); Burnette v. Wells Fargo Bank,
N.A., No. 4:09-CV-370, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24686, at *28 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2010),
adopted by Burnette v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 4:09-CV-370, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
24679, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 17, 2010).
187. Huff v. Hirsch, No. 01-09-00517-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 6831, at *14-15 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 19, 2010, no pet.).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at *14.
191. Id.
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Finally, in Wright v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co.,192 the U.S. Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Texas granted Nationwide's motion
to dismiss Wright's DTPA claims on the basis that Wright, a former Na-
tionwide agent, was not a DTPA consumer. Wright took issue with his
termination and its effect on his book of business. Wright asserted a
DTPA claim, and tried to establish consumer status by arguing that his
claims involved the purchase or lease of goods or services, including
training materials, records, computer equipment, and supplies as set forth
in his written employment agreement. 193 The court rejected this argu-
ment, holding that Wright did not seek or acquire goods by sale or lease;
rather, he was contracted as Nationwide's agent and was merely provided
with training and materials to assist him in his duties.194 The court added
that such training and materials did not form a basis for his complaint,
which further negated consumer status. 195
B. DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
In addition to establishing consumer status, a DTPA plaintiff must also
establish violation of one or more substantive DTPA prohibitions.' 96
1. Laundry List Claims
In Sheehan v. Adams, 19 7 the Dallas Court of Appeals examined
whether there was sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict finding
that Bruce and Sammi Adams violated the DTPA when they sold their
house to Sheehan without disclosing the home's alleged foundation
problems. Sheehan alleged that the Adams' violated section 17.46(b)(24)
of the DTPA.198 Sheehan admitted, however, that the only representa-
tions made to her regarding the house's conditions were contained in the
"Seller's Disclosure Notice" completed by Bruce Adams, and that those
representations indicated the Adamses were unaware of any conditions
regarding the house other than "settling," which was characterized as
"normal."1 99 The jury returned a verdict in favor of Sheehan, but the
trial court rendered a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and ordered
Sheehan take nothing on her claims.200
192. No. 6:09 CV 183, 2010 WL 278482, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2010).
193. Id. at *3.
194. Id.
195. Id. (following Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 539 (Tex. 1981)
(DTPA goods and services must form the basis of the DTPA complaint)).
196. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.50(a)(1)-(3) (West 2011). See generally TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. §§ 541.003-.007 (West 2011).
197. 320 S.W.3d 890, 897 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.).
198. Section 17.46(b)(24) provides that it is a violation of the DTPA to fail to disclose
information concerning goods or services which was known at the time of the transaction if
such failure to disclose such information was intended to induce the consumer into a trans-
action into which the consumer would not have entered had the information been dis-
closed. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(24).
199. Sheehan, 320 S.W.3d at 893. The Seller's Disclosure Notice derives from section
5.008(b) of the Texas Property Code. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 5.008(b) (West 2011).
200. Sheehan, 320 S.W.3d at 895.
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On appeal, the Dallas Court of Appeals held that to support the jury's
verdict, the evidence had to show that the Adamses failed to disclose in-
formation they actually knew, rather than information they should have
known.20 1 Given the absence of direct evidence that the Adamses were
aware of any alleged foundation failure, and that the three-foot exterior
crack at issue was non-existent at the time of closing, the court held the
evidence legally insufficient to support the jury's verdict under section
17.46(b)(24). 202
2. Section 17.50-Breach of Warranty
Section 17.50 of the DTPA permits actions for breach of express or
implied warranties.203 In Dinn v. Hooking Bull Boatyard, Inc.,204 the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas sitting in admiralty,
found that although Hooking Bull Boatyard did not breach an express
warranty, it violated the DTPA by breaching an implied warranty. The
Dinns hired Hooking Bull Boatyard to repair and paint their racing
yacht. After admiring the metallic finish on a boat stored next to theirs,
the Dinns chose an aquamarine metallic paint for their yacht. The paint
dried with unsightly tiger-striped patterns and eventually blistered and
"halo-ed., 20 5
Relying on Texas law, which recognizes "an implied warranty to repair
or modify existing tangible goods or property in a good and workmanlike
manner [for] consumers suing under the DTPA," the court found there
was an implied warranty with respect to the paint and repair work per-
formed on the Dinns' yacht.20 6 Good and workmanlike manner is de-
fined "as that quality of work performed by one who has the knowledge,
training, or experience necessary for the successful practice of a trade or
occupation and performed in a manner generally considered proficient by
those capable of judging such work. '20 7 Inasmuch as Hooking Bull Boat-
yard's owner, painter, and expert agreed the paint job was unacceptable,
a breach of this type of implied warranty was established.208 The court
further held it did not matter whether Hooking Bull Boatyard informed
the Dinns of its inexperience with the metallic paint at issue because the
implied warranty of good and workmanlike performance cannot be
waived or disclaimed.209
The court held, however, that the alleged statement by Hooking Bull
Boatyard's owner that he had "the best boat painter in the region" did
201. Id. at 899.
202. Id.
203. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a)(2).
204. No. C-08-309, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104814, at *27, *29 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2010).
205. Id. at *11-12. "Halo-ing" results when blistered paint is repaired and spot-
painted. Id. at *14.
206. Id. at *25-26 (quoting Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349, 354
(Tex. 1987)).
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not amount to an express warranty.210 Instead, it was mere puffery and
thus not actionable under the DTPA.211 Nor did the existence of another
boat on the yard with a successful metallic paint job amount to a model
or sample to which Hooking Bull Boatyard agreed to conform.212 As
such, there was no express warranty claim.213
C. NECESSITY OF PROVING CAUSATION
To recover under the DTPA, a consumer must prove that a defendant's
actions were the "producing cause" of the consumer's damage.214 "Pro-
ducing cause" requires proof that the acts in question be both a cause-in-
fact and a "substantial factor" in causing injuries that would not have
otherwise occurred. 215
In Metro Allied Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Lin,216 the Texas Supreme
Court held that to establish causation for an alleged failure to procure
insurance under a negligence or DTPA theory, a plaintiff must prove
availability of appropriate insurance. Lin, an electrical engineer, was re-
quired by a government contract to provide a performance bond and pro-
cure commercial general liability insurance (CGL). Lin provided Metro
with a copy of a CGL quote obtained from another insurer (Elbert) to
illustrate the insurance he sought from Metro. The Elbert quote con-
tained a section entitled "conditions" under which the word "contractual"
was marked with an "X. ' '2 17 Thereafter, Lin began paying Metro for
CGL coverage, but Metro failed to write or procure the CGL policy.
Lin's government contract was later terminated, requiring Lin's surety
company to complete performance of the contract under the performance
bond.218
The surety company sued Lin, who in turn, sought defense from
Metro.219 Metro's errors and omissions insurer refused to defend Lin, so
Lin sued Metro under the DTPA for failure to procure insurance. 220
Metro argued that despite its failure to procure the CGL policy, the nec-
essary causation standard was not be met because Lin lacked proof that
an available CGL policy would have covered his damages.
The supreme court held that the alleged harm would have occurred
only if the CGL policy Metro agreed to procure actually covered the
210. Id. at *29.
211. Id.
212. Id. An express warranty may be created when a seller uses a sample or model that
becomes the basis of the bargain that the goods shall conform to the model. TEX. Bus.
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313(b) (West 2011).
213. Dinn v. Hooking Bull Boatyard, Inc., No. C-08-309, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104814,
at *27, *29 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 2010).
214. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.50(a)(1)-(3) (West 2011). See generally, TEX.
INS. CODE ANN. § 541.003 (West 2011).
215. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Jefferson Assocs., Ltd., 896 S.W.2d 156, 167 (Tex. 1995).
216. 304 S.W.3d 830, 835-36 (Tex. 2009).
217. Id. at 833.





surety's claim against Lin, and thus Lin had to show that the coverage he
sought was available in a CGL policy.22 1 The supreme court held that
Lin's testimony regarding Metro's agent statement that he believed the
policy would cover "the claims" against Lin did not amount to evidence
that any procured contract would have actually covered the surety com-
pany's claims against Lin.222 No other evidence of any CGL policy po-
tentially covering the surety company's claims was provided, nor was any
testimony provided by an Elbert representative or insurance expert ex-
plaining the meaning of the policy terms.223 Rather, the key witness was
Metro's agent, who testified that in his experience a CGL policy does not
cover performance under a contract, reasoning "if the coverage was that
broad, [Lin] wouldn't have to have performance bonds, all [he] would
have to have would be contractual liability. ' 224 Accordingly, the supreme
court held that Lin failed to bring forward any evidence of cause in fact
and therefore could not establish DTPA causation. 22 5
D. EXEMPTIONS, DEFENSES, AND LIMITATIONS ON RECOVERY
The U.S. District Courts for the Northern and Eastern Districts of
Texas decided that DTPA claims do not survive a consumer's death. In
Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharmaceuticals, the Northern
District court made an Erie guess as to how the Texas Supreme Court
would decide whether Christopher Lofton's DTPA claim survived his
death.226 In Launius v. Allstate Insurance Co.,2 27 the court analyzed a
split among the intermediate Texas appellate courts and the Texas Su-
preme Court's decision in PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers
Partners Ltd.,228 finding that DTPA claims do not survive a consumer's
death and cannot be brought by the consumer's estate.22 9 The Lofton
court followed the Launius decision, which was also followed by the East-
ern District in McCoy v. Pfizer, Inc., in holding that a consumer's estate
could not pursue a DTPA claim.230
E. DETERMINING THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES
A prevailing plaintiff in a DTPA action may attempt to recover eco-
221. Id. at 835-36.
222. Id. at 836.
223. Id. at 837.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 838.
226. Lofton v. McNeil Consumer & Specialty Pharm., 682 F. Supp. 2d 662, 680 (N.D.
Tex. Jan. 27, 2010).
227. No. 3:06-CV-0579-B, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28286, at *13-14 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 17,
2007).
228. 146 S.W.3d 79, 82 (Tex. 2004) (holding that DTPA claims cannot be assigned).
229. Launius, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28286, at *18.
230. McCoy v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 4:09cv496, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87577, at *2 (E.D.
Tex., Aug. 24, 2010) (adopting magistrate's recommendations set forth in McCoy v. Pfizer,
Inc., No. 4:09cv496, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87579, at *18 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 3, 2010) and
collecting cases).
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nomic damages.231 If the trier of fact finds that the defendant acted
"knowingly," the plaintiff may also recover damages for mental anguish
and statutory damages up to three times the amount of economic
damages. 232
1. Settlement Credits
In Ramsey v. Spray,233 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's application of settlement moneys paid by settling defendants.
The Sprays purchased a home with significant roof leaks from the Ram-
seys. The Sprays sued the Ramseys and several other parties. The Sprays
settled and released their claims against all parties, except the Ramseys,
for $400,000.234 During jury trial, the Ramseys introduced the settlement
agreement to obtain settlement credits offered under section 33.012 of
the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. 235 However, the trial court
failed to apply the settlement credit to the amount awarded to the Sprays.
An appeal followed, and the court that held section 33.012 is
mandatory and requires settlement credits to apply to "damages to be
recovered by the claimant." The court clarified that the credit is applied
to the amount of damages awarded in the judgment, not to the amount of
damages found by a jury.236 "A nonsettling defendant has the burden to
prove the existence and amount of a settlement credit, and may do so by
placing the settlement agreement or some other evidence of the settle-
ment amount in the record," as the Ramseys had.237 The burden "then
shifts to the plaintiff to show that all or a portion of this settlement
amount should not be credited. '238
A nonsettling defendant may only claim the settlement amount as to
causes of action for which all tortfeasors are jointly liable and "is not
entitled to credit for amounts paid to settle punitive damages claims. '239
The burden is on the plaintiff to tender a valid settlement agreement that
allocates between actual and punitive damages, and sole and joint liability
claims.240 The Sprays' settlement agreement did not satisfy these require-
ments; therefore, the Ramseys were entitled to a settlement credit of
$400,000.241 The case was remanded to the trial court for proper applica-
231. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(1) (West 2011).
232. Id.
233. No. 2-08-129-CV, 2009 WL 5064539, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2009, pet. de-
nied) (not reported).
234. Id. at *1.
235. Id. Section 33.012 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs settle-
ment credits in tort and DTPA cases. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.012 (West
2011).
236. Ramsey, 2009 WL 5064539, at *1 (quoting TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 33.012(b)).
237. Id. at *2.
238. Id.
239. Id.




tion of the credit.242
2. Restoration
In Cruz v. Andrew's Restoration, Inc.,243 the Dallas Court of Appeals
held that a DTPA claimant is not entitled to the equitable remedy of
restoration when he has not surrendered or offered to surrender the
value of any benefits received. Dr. Cruz enlisted Protech Services to per-
form mold-remediation work on his house. Dr. Cruz later notified his
insurer of unabated mold damage to the home. Thereafter, his insurer
agreed to pay for humidity control services from June 2002 to June 2003,
but after reaching policy limits in November 2003, the insurer stopped
paying and left Protech's remaining invoices unpaid.244 Protech then
sued Dr. Cruz and his insurer under several theories, and Dr. Cruz filed a
counterclaim asserting DTPA claims against Protech. 245 The trial court
granted summary judgment in Dr. Cruz's favor on his DTPA claims, rul-
ing it would take approximately $1 million to restore all the money paid
to Protech by Dr. Cruz or on his behalf.246 Dr. Cruz requested restora-
tion, however, the trial court twice denied this request.247
On appeal, Dr. Cruz argued that the trial court erred in denying his
motions for restoration and rescission pursuant to section 17.50(b)(3).2 48
Protech and a third-party defendant argued that the trial court properly
denied restoration benefits because Dr. Cruz had not surrendered the
benefits he received from them.249 The court agreed, holding that section
17.50(b)(3) incorporated the equitable doctrine of rescission, requiring
the claimant to return any benefits received under the contract.250 Dr.
Cruz argued that he did not retain any benefits from Protech under their
contract because his house was demolished in 2005.251 The court dis-
agreed, holding there was some evidence of a benefit because Protech
was able to dehumidify the house for approximately a year and demoli-
tion did not occur until over eighteen months after the dehumidifying
services ceased. 252 Accordingly, the trial court did not err in denying Dr.
Cruz's request for restoration of consideration under section
17.50(b)(3). 253
242. Id. at *7.
243. 323 S.W.3d 564, 581 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, pet. filed).
244. Id. at 575 (humidity control services incurred a daily rate of approximately $6,300).
245. Id. at 570.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 580.
248. Id. at 580-81. Section 17.50(b)(3) provides that "each consumer who prevails [on
a DTPA claim] may obtain orders necessary to restore to any party to the suit any money
or property, real or personal, which may have been acquired in violation of this sub-
chapter." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(b)(3) (West 2011).
249. Cruz, 323 S.W.3d at 581.
250. Id.
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3. Mental Anguish
In Norris v. Jackson,254 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court's award of mental anguish damages in favor of Jackson, a sev-
enty-year-old grandmother who contracted with a service company for
installation of a new heating and air conditioning unit. At issue was Nor-
ris's conduct of calling Jackson a "crook" and a "thief" and threatening to
sue Jackson for refusing to pay $1,000 allegedly owed by her.255 Jackson,
however, contended that she executed a completion certificate with the
service company in exchange for a promise not to cancel the contract and
accepted a $1,000 reduction in her bill as compensation for damages to
her property.256
On appeal, Norris and the service company argued that the evidence
was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's finding
that Jackson was entitled to mental anguish damages. 257 A consumer
seeking mental anguish damages must present:
[Direct evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of [the]
mental anguish, thus establishing a substantial disruption in [her]
daily routine. Proof of a physical manifestation of mental anguish is
not required. But a plaintiff's own testimony of extreme fright, con-
stant worry, extreme apprehension, extreme embarrassment, ner-
vousness on a daily basis, and loss of sleep does not, without more,
present more than a scintilla of evidence to support an award of
mental anguish damages.258
Jackson testified extensively as to the nature, duration, and severity of
her mental anguish. 259 The court held that such testimony was "'direct
evidence of the nature, duration, and severity of mental anguish,' and
254. No. 2-09-265-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 8688, at *1 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Oct.
28, 2010, no pet.).
255. Id. at *5.
256. Id. at *3-4 (the service company had damaged a door frame and an antique grand-
father clock).
257. Id. at *24.
258. Id. at *24-25 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
259. Id. at *26-27 ("Jackson testified ... that her blood pressure had stayed in the 120s
before the June 22 telephone call with Norris; that her blood pressure went up to 180
during and immediately after the telephone call with Norris and was staying way over 140,
160 usually since the call; that there were no factors other than Appellants' actions that
caused her high blood pressure; that she believed Norris's threats; that she previously had
no trouble sleeping but could not sleep after the telephone call because of her fear that a
lien would be placed on her house; that Norris's bully talking made her feel very intimi-
dated, nervous, and very scared; that she is no longer the content and happy person she
was before the telephone call; and that she [was] tired from the stress, [was] worried, [was]
not as energetic, and [was] irritable with her grandchildren." Another witness testified that
"Jackson was very upset and frightened immediately after the telephone call with Norris;
that he personally observed how Norris's conduct affected Jackson; that Jackson constantly
worried about the situation and was "really, really upset; that she was irritable with her
grandchildren to the point where he thought other arrangements for their care should be
made for Jackson's sake; that Jackson called him late at night, when she was normally
asleep, to talk about what happened; that Jackson's health had gone downhill a lot since
the telephone call; and that Jackson was normally a very organized person but had lost
control since the telephone call.").
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established 'a substantial disruption in [Jackson's] daily routine.'"260
Thus, the court affirmed the award of mental anguish damages.261
IV. CONCLUSION
Three years ago, this survey quoted Justice Stevens's dissenting opinion
in Twombly, posing the question whether "in the quest for avoiding false
positives, it is good policy to allow 'lawyers' debates over economic the-
ory to conclusively resolve antitrust suits in the absence of any evi-
dence."' 262 Whether or not it is good policy, the Fifth Circuit's Leegin
opinion confirms that such a policy has taken root.263 Facially rejecting
the plaintiffs' claims as "implausible" because they "def[ied] the basic
laws of economics," the Fifth Circuit effectively realized the Chicago
School's inexorable twenty-five year pursuit of a per se legality regime for
vertical restraints, as amici argued, but the Leegin panel declined to
acknowledge. 264
There is no small irony in the fact that as the courts continue to exclude
scientific evidence as unreliable under the Daubert and Kumho regime,265
they are effectively immunizing from judicial scrutiny a much-criticized
school of economic theory by recasting it as "law," with the result that
competing theories and evidence are rejected outright. If there is any
lesson learned from the last twenty-five years of financial crises, it should
be that the notion of markets as rational, informationally efficient, and
self-correcting is a dangerous myth. Whether called "hundred-year
storms," "Black Swans," or "six sigma" events, catastrophic market fail-
ures can and frequently do happen, not just once every hundred or thou-
sand years. 266 Even Judge Posner, a leading figure in the Chicago School,
conceded that markets are not self-correcting and require government
regulation to function.2 67 Although Judge Posner focused on the
260. Id. at *27.
261. Id. at *30-31.
262. Ferrill, supra note 42, at 566 (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955,
1988 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
263. See PSK, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 420-21 (5th
Cir. 2010).
264. Id. at 418-19.
265. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993); Kumho Tire
Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 158 (1999).
266. See generally Roger Lowenstein, WHEN GENIUS FAILED, THE RISE AND FALL OF
LONG TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT (2002); Nassim Nicholas Taleb, FOOLED By RAN-
DOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN THE MARKETS AND IN LIFE (2001). In the
last twenty-five years the financial markets have witnessed at least six such events, includ-
ing the 1987 stock market crash, the 1994 Mexican debt crisis, the 1997 Asian crisis, the
1998 Russian devaluation, the 2000 Internet bubble, and the 2008 economic crisis. See id.
at 48-49.
267. Richard A. Posner, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM (Harvard University Press 2009).
No doubt recognizing such an admission would threaten to undermine the very foundation
of Chicago School theory, Judge Posner offered assurance that "[a]t no stage need irration-
ality" on the part of market participants be involved to explain market failures, because
"the line between the rational and irrational is at best unclear, and this is one reason for
not placing much weight on the irrational aspects of market behavior." Id. at 85-87. In
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macroeconomic picture, the same theoretical assumptions-self-cor-
recting markets populated by rational utility maximizers-are at the core
of Chicago School antitrust economics.268
Refusing to admit evidence contrary to dogma is not, of course, with-
out precedent. Four hundred years ago, Galileo Galilei incurred the
wrath of both the scientific and the clerical establishments when he advo-
cated Copernican astronomy and its heliocentric view of the solar sys-
tem. 269 Other scientists attacked heliocentrism because it conflicted with
Aristotle's model of the universe, while both establishments attacked it as
contrary to divine scripture.270 Galileo's critics refused his repeated en-
treaties that they simply examine the evidence, preferring instead, to ad-
here to elaborate mathematical models purporting to demonstrate that
the sun orbited the earth.2 71 As Galileo complained to Kepler: "What
would you say of the learned here, who replete with the pertinacity of the
asp, have steadfastly refused to cast a glance through the telescope?
What shall we make of all of this? Shall we laugh, or shall we cry?" 272
Galileo was subsequently convicted of heresy and the offending Dia-
logues of Galileo Galilei were banned.273
Antitrust jurisprudence certainly benefits from the use of economic
theory by helping to guide attempts at distinguishing anticompetitive bus-
iness arrangements from procompetitive or competitively benign ones,
and the courts have properly shed any reluctance they once might have
had to "ramble through the wilds of economic theory. '274 Indeed, the
problem with the Leegin panel's disposition was not its resort to eco-
nomic theory, but its blind adherence to one particular model-effec-
tively transmuting it into law-and its refusal to entertain alternative
theories or evidence of actual competitive harm. The panel compounded
this error by characterizing the plaintiff's pleadings in a way that sug-
gested the plaintiff had not alleged facts supporting its allegations.275
other words, it is easier to pretend that markets are always rational than to grapple with a
reality that does not fit the model.
268. See generally THE GALILEO AFFAIR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (Maurice A. Fi-




272. Giorgio de Santillana, THE CRIME OF GALILEO 9 (Univ. of Chi. Press 1955).
273. See Sentence of The Tribunal of the Supreme Inquisition Against Galileo Galilei,
given the 22nd day of June of the Year 1633, in INTERNET MODERN HISTORY SOURCEBOOK
(Paul Halsall ed., 1999) http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/modl1630galileo.html.
274. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 n.10 (1972).
275. For example, while the panel opinion suggests that the plaintiff's complaint did not
allege facts in support of its proposed market definition, the complaint specifically alleged:
(1) Leegin products by design were highly differentiated from other products; (2) there was
low cross-elasticity of demand such that other products would not qualify as competitors
under the DOJ/FTC SSNIP test; and (3) Leegin deliberately chose an alternative distribu-
tion channel to further differentiate its products. See supra notes 112-13, 128 and accom-
panying text. While Leegin's petition to the Supreme Court charitably did not accuse the
panel opinion of misrepresenting the record, it is as if the Leegin panel concluded that the
plaintiff's allegations did not exist because under the panel's model of the market the facts
alleged could not exist. See also Sam D. Johnson & A. Michael Ferrill, Defining Competi-
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Faced with the choice between theoretical elegance and analytical rich-
ness, the courts should be reluctant to choose the former at the risk of
stunting the law's ability to develop as new and better ways of analyzing
economic questions emerge. In categorically rejecting claims of competi-
tive harm as "implausible" whenever the prevailing dogma denies their
possibility, and denying a plaintiff the opportunity to develop evidence of
such harm, courts run the risk of inviting comparisons to the Galileo Af-
fair, and in more modern terms, validating the adage that there is a "fine
line between stupid and clever. '276
tion: Economic Analysis and Antitrust Decisionmaking, 36 BAYLOR L. REV. 584, 620 (1984)
(observing that "if that which antitrust seeks to proscribe does not exist because it cannot
exist, there is no apparent need for the law's sanction").
276. THIS IS SPINAL TAP (Embassy Pictures 1984).
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